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Stochastic dominance  analysis of five crop rotations  using twenty-one  years of experimental
yield data returned  results consistent  with Pennsylvania  cropping practices.  The analysis
incorporated  yield risk, output price  risk, and rotational  yield effects.  A rotation of two  years
corn  and three  years alfalfa hay dominated  for approximately  risk neutral  and risk averse
preferences,  as  did participation  in government  programs  under the  1990 Farm  Bill. Crop
rotation  selection appeared  to impact net revenues  more than  the decision to participate  in
government programs.
Before  inexpensive  inorganic  fertilizers  were  ment  in  central  Pennsylvania  (Centre  County),
widely  available,  farmers  used  crop  rotation  to  thereby  capturing  rotational  yield  effects  not  ob-
maintain soil productivity  and control  insects, dis-  servable  in simulated rotations. Net revenue distri-
eases, and weeds. The gradual replacement  of crop  butions, which incorporate yield risk, output price
rotation by  inorganic  nitrogen  fertilizers  and pes-  risk, and government  commodity program partici-
ticides  reflected  the  view  that  nitrogen  could  be  pation  under  the  1990  Farm  Bill, are  developed.
eliminated as a growth-limiting  factor (Kurtz et al.  Generalized  stochastic  dominance  analysis is used
1984). Recently, however, changes in environmen-  to investigate the link between crop rotation choice
tal, political, and market forces have generated  re-  and risk preferences.
newed interest in crop rotation as a yield risk man-
agement  tool.
Environmental  concerns  and  farm  legislation  Ba
have encouraged  lower use of  synthetic  chemical
inputs. Increased  international  trade of U.S.  agri-
cultural  products  and  wider  fluctuations  in  input  Generalized  stochastic dominance  (also  known  as
prices  during the  last twenty years  (Musser  1994)  stochastic  dominance with respect to a function) is
suggest that price risk may be increasing.  The re-  a flexible evaluative tool grounded in the expected
cent policy  emphasis  on  market  orientation  indi-  utility  hypothesis  (Meyer  1977).  It ranks  risky al-
cates  that  farmers  will  receive  less  government  ternatives  for selected risk preference intervals de-
protection  from risk. Even prior to the  1996 Farm  fined by the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion co-
Bill,  target prices  were  reduced  and then  frozen  efficient.  An attractive feature of generalized  sto-
while  market prices  increased,  and program  pay-  chastic  dominance for the researcher is that it does
ment yields were frozen  while actual  yields tended  not  require  specific  knowledge  of an  individual's
to rise.  utility function. Another advantage is its ability  to
To facilitate policy analysis and program design,  evaluate  the  full  range  of  risk preferences,  from
Williams  et al.  (1993)  suggest that additional  crop  risk preferring  to risk averse.
rotation  research is needed  on different  crops  and  Generalized  stochastic  dominance  is  imple-
in  different  production  regions.  This  study  uses  mented  by selecting an  interval bounded by upper
yield  data from  a long-term  crop rotation  experi-  and  lower values of the absolute risk aversion  co-
efficient  (Meyer  1977).  Within  this  interval,  the
utility function  with the highest probability  of not
preferring action H to action  G is identified.  If, for
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searcher  to control the  trade-off between accuracy  analyzed  using  first-,  second-,  and  third-degree
and  discriminatory  power  (King  and  Robison  stochastic  dominance.  Brown  also  presented  a
1981;  Cochran  1986).  The wider  the  interval, the  mean-variance  analysis  with  a graphical  estimate
greater  the accuracy, but the lower the discrimina-  of the risk efficiency  frontier.  An  analysis  of the
tory power.  decision  to double-crop  wheat and  soybeans  con-
Cochran  (1986)  provides  a  summary  of  com-  cluded  that  a farmer's  individual  situation  can af-
monly used risk aversion coefficients,  six of which  fect  decisions  (Harper  et  al.  1991).  Analysis  of
were  elicited  directly  and  are  shown  in  table  1.  variance  results  from  a study  of New York  dairy
Cochran suggests that the majority of farmers'  risk  farmers  by  Tauer  (1986)  yielded  tentative  confir-
preferences  can be represented within the interval  mation that risk preferences  determine farming  de-
-.0002  to  .0015,  measured  at after-tax  net  farm  cisions, but that other factors may be more impor-
income  levels.  Concerning  the  incidence  of  risk  tant  than  risk preference  in  guiding  action.  Will-
preferences  among farmers, Tauer's  study of sev-  iams, Harper,  and Barnaby (1990)  suggest that the
enty-two  New  York dairy  farmers  classified  26%  decision to pursue  one means  of risk management
as risk preferring,  39%  as risk neutral, and 34%  as  cannot rationally be made  in isolation from  issues
risk averse. In the aggregate,  the sample of farmers  of the cost  and availability of other forms of risk
was  decreasingly risk averse as  income increased.  protection.
Another study  of forty-five Minnesota  swine pro-  Mathematical  programming can be an appropri-
ducers  classified  22%  as  risk preferring,  36%  as  ate  tool  for  evaluating  crop  rotations.  Novak,
risk neutral,  and 42%  as  risk averse  (Wilson  and  Mitchell,  and  Crews (1990)  used  Target-MOTAD
Eidman  1983).  The  relatively  high  incidence  of  and ten years of experimental data to determine the
risk-preferring  behavior  in  the two  studies  was  a  risk-minimizing  rotation  scheme  for  a given  ac-
factor in the decision to use generalized  stochastic  ceptable  level  of return.  Quadratic  programming
dominance  for this  analysis.  with  parameterized  risk preferences  was  used  by
A number of previous studies presented stochas-  Musser  and Stamoulis  (1981)  to  evaluate  agricul-
tic dominance  analyses  of cropping  decisions,  ad-  tural  commodity  programs.  Duffy  and  Taylor
dressed  the relative  influence  of risk preferences,  (1994) used dynamic programming to examine the
and recognized other important determinants of be-  effect of policy uncertainty  on crop mix decisions.
havior. Zacharias and Grube (1984) used stochastic  Musser et al.  (1985)  presented a generalized  linear
dominance  techniques  to study  crop rotations  as  a  programming  approach  to  address  applications
weed control tool. Yield data were obtained from a  with  many  potential  rotations.  An  advantage  of
ten-year experiment  in Illinois, output prices  were  mathematical  programming  approaches  over  sto-
held constant,  and  rankings  for three  risk prefer-  chastic  dominance  is  the  ability  to examine  port-
ence intervals  were presented.  The dominant rota-  folios of rotations.  In  this  study, most of the rota-
tion in all three intervals was a two-year corn, one-  tions  were  dominated  by  two crops  (corn  and  al-
year  soybeans  rotation.  Brown  (1987)  found  a  falfa),  and  high  net  revenue  correlations  across
close  correspondence  between  producer  behavior  rotations were expected. Thus, the strengths of sto-
and stochastic dominance results in a study of Sas-  chastic  dominance  were  expected to  outweigh the
katchewan crop farmers.  A fifteen-year period was  limitation of not considering  optimal portfolios.
Table  1.  Empirically  Estimated Pratt-Arrow Risk Aversion  Coefficients
Almost Risk  Strongly  Outcome
Study  Neutral  Risk Averse  Variable
Cochran  1982  .0015  annual  income
10-acre block
Love and Robison  1984  -.00001  to  >.0025  after-tax
.0002  annual  income
Wilson  and Eidman  -.0001  to  .001  to .002  after-tax  annual
1983  +.0001  farm income
King and  Oamek  -.00001  to  .00005 to .0001  annual  farm
1983  +.00001  income
King and  Robison  -.0001  to .0001  .001  annual  income
1981
Tauer  1986  -.0001  to  .001  >.001  annual  farm  income
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Data and Methods  each year. Missing or zero yield observations  were
discarded because most cases resulted from bird or
The analysis  was  structured  around a hypothetical  deer damage, which can cause total crop failure on
cash  crop  farm  with  400  tillable  acres.  The  size  a  small  experimental  plot, though not  on  a  com-
was chosen  so as to be representative  of cash crop  mercial-sized field. One ton of straw per acre  (val-
farms  in central Pennsylvania  and large enough to  ued at  $65  per ton) was  assumed to  be harvested
ensure  that  the  machinery  complements  used  in  with each oats or wheat crop. Summary statistics of
each rotation were cost effective. Acreage  was dis-  the experimental yield data are presented in table 2.
tributed  based  on  the  proportion  of  each  crop  Given the typically negative  correlation (ceteris
grown  in a given  rotation.  paribus)  between yield and  output price, consider-
The yield data for this study were collected from  ation of yield risk alone was expected to introduce
an  ongoing  long-term  crop  rotation  study  con-  an  avoidable  bias  in  the  stochastic  dominance
ducted by Penn State agronomists since  1969. The  rankings,  particularly  given  the  possibility of  in-
experiment  site is endowed  with a highly produc-  creasing  price  risk (Musser  1977).  Hence,  output
tive soil type, Hagerstown  silt  loam. Major changes  price risk was considered as well. Average nominal
in the rotation study were instituted in 1990,  so the  crop prices received by Pennsylvania farmers from
analysis  was  limited  to  data from  five  crop rota-  1969 to 1989 were obtained from the USDA's An-
tions  consistently  studied  during  the  twenty-one-  nual Price Summary (1970-90)  and  the Keystone
year period from  1969 to  1989.  Technology  (e.g.,  Ag  Digest (Pennsylvania  Agricultural  Statistics
seed  varieties)  has  advanced  since  the  study  pe-  Service  1970-90). As Pennsylvania seasonal  aver-
riod; this technological progress could pose a limi-  age  alfalfa prices  were not reported during most of
tation  if  it  occurred  unevenly  among  the  crops  the period, the average  monthly price from June to
since  1989.  The rotations  are denoted  as follows:  September  was  used  as  a proxy.  The  four-month
C  Continuous  corn (Rotation  1)  period was  selected  to encompass  the  harvest pe-
CS  Corn-Soybeans  (Rotation 2)  riod for current  year alfalfa  marketings.
CAA  Corn-Alfalfa-Alfalfa  (Rotation  3)  The time series of yields  and output prices were CAA  Corn-Alfalfa-Alfalfa (Rotation 3)
CCAAA  Corn-Corn-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa  detrended using ARIMA models to reflect revenue
CAA  C(Rotation  4)  -AflaAff  risk at a single point in time. As Ford, Musser,  and (Rotation 4)
COWAA  Corn-Oats-Wheat-Alfalfa-Alfalfa  Yonkers  (1993)  indicate,  ARIMA  techniques  can
(Rotation  5)  be simpler and more accommodating of misspeci-
fication  error  than  other  detrending  approaches.
Each of the sixteen crops  was replicated  on four  Two  cases  were  analyzed  in  this  study. The  first
plots each year. Replications  were  averaged to ob-  case  involved  detrending  the  yield  and  nominal
tain  a single  "whole  farm"  yield  for  each  crop  output price series separately. Maintaining separate
Table 2.  Summary Statistics  of Yield  Data (in bushels/acre,  except  hay, tons/acre)
Std.
Rotation  Crop  Mean  Min  Max  Dev.  Skewness
1  C  139.62  91.32  184.93  28.90  -0.10
2  C  145.30  86.99  198.63  32.56  -0.04
S  33.06  18.87  52.60  8.85  0.56
3  C  154.31  95.57  210.43  30.15  0.01
Al  2.31  0.93  3.26  0.65  -0.62
A2  4.89  3.90  8.05  0.90  2.26
4  C  153.35  98.11  202.08  31.68  -0.20
C2  148.54  97.57  192.08  28.03  -0.04
Al  2.26  0.97  3.11  0.55  -0.72
A2  4.75  3.61  6.32  0.74  0.40
A3  5.06  4.04  7.80  0.84  1.65
5  C  152.70  94.42  208.40  31.15  0.00
0  74.41  35.18  116.40  23.96  0.27
W  42.68  27.08  60.80  8.95  0.53
Al  4.04  1.47  5.86  1.17  -0.66
A2  4.87  3.69  7.63  0.88  1.60
where  C  =  corn,  C2  =  corn  after corn,  S  =  soybeans,  Al  =  first-year  alfalfa,  A2  =  second-year  alfalfa,  A3  =  third-year
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series  allowed the  simulation  of government  cor-  around the average  1993  prices  received  by Penn-
modity  program participation  but  did not  account  sylvania  farmers  (USDA  1994).  For  purposes  of
for the  covariances  of yields  and prices.  The  sec-  comparison, residuals  in the case  of gross revenue
ond  case  involved  detrending  nominal  gross  rev-  detrending were  centered  around the  same values.
enue series. While government programs could not  Costs were held constant in this analysis because
be simulated without explicit yields,  this approach  of  data  constraints  and  were  expressed  in  1993
reflected  the interaction  of yields and prices.  The  prices.  Enterprise  budgets  were  developed  using
use  of  two  approaches  also  helped  establish  the  the  Mississippi  State Budget  Generator  (Spurlock
robustness  of the  stochastic dominance  results.  and Laughlin  1987). Variable  costs were  based on
In both cases,  Dickey-Fuller  tests could not re-  field operations used in the long-term crop rotation
ject the null hypothesis  of unit-root nonstationarity  study (where applicable)  or recommended farming
in almost  all  of the  time  series. After  taking  first  practices  as  detailed  in  The  Agronomy  Guide,
differences,  nonstationarity  was  rejected in all se-  1993-1994 (Penn  State  Cooperative  Extension
ries.  The  autocorrelation,  partial  autocorrelation,  1993).  Conventional  tillage  was  used  in  all crops
and inverse autocorrelation functions of each series  except  oats  in the  COWAA  rotation,  which  used
were  examined  to  identify  appropriate  ARIMA  no-till.  Fertilizer  application  rates  were  based  on
processes.  Processes  were  individually  selected  removal rates  associated  with  experimental  yield
based  on  minimization  of  Akaike's  Information  goals  (when  observed  yields  approximated  yield
Criterion (AIC),  statistical significance  of AR and  goals) or average yield (when observed yields were
MA parameters,  and whiteness  of the resulting re-  consistently  lower  than  yield  goals).  Corn  crops
siduals.  The  estimated  ARIMA  models  for  indi-  following  alfalfa received  nitrogen  credits  of  110
vidual  crop yields,  nominal  output prices,  and ro-  pounds per acre for the first year and 50 pounds per
tation gross revenues  are  detailed in table  3.  acre  for the second  year. Corn following  soybeans
In  the case  of separate  yield and price detrend-  received a nitrogen credit of 50 pounds per acre. In
ing,  residuals  from one-step-ahead yield  forecasts  the  COWAA  rotation,  alfalfa  was  established  by
were  centered  around  the forecasts  corresponding  seeding it in the fall with the winter wheat crop. In
to  1993.  Output  price  residuals  were  centered  the  CAA  and  CCAAA  rotations,  the  alfalfa  was
Table  3.  Estimated ARIMA  Processes  for Experimental Yields,  Nominal  Prices, and Rotation
Gross  Revenues
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spring  seeded  and two  cuttings  were  taken in  the  presented in table 4. Recognizing the interaction of
establishment year. Three cuttings were taken from  prices  and yields by detrending  gross revenues re-
mature  alfalfa  stands in all applicable  rotations.  suited in  both lower mean values  and  lower vari-
Prices  of seed and chemical  inputs  such as  fer-  ances in rotation returns. The CCAAA rotation had
tilizer,  herbicides,  and  pesticides  were  obtained  the  highest  mean  and  minimum  values,  the  con-
from two  local  input suppliers. Variable  costs de-  tinuous corn rotation (C) had the highest maximum
pendent  on  yield  (hauling  and  drying)  totalled  value,  and  the  COWAA  rotation  had  the  lowest
$0.20  per  bushel  for  corn,  $0.07  per  bushel  for  standard  deviation.  All  of  the  rotations  yielded
wheat and oats, $0.02 per bushel for soybeans,  and  higher mean  net revenue  and  lower  standard  de-
$1.80  per ton  for alfalfa  hay. Fixed costs per acre  viation with participation in government programs.
were  calculated  for each  of the five  rotations  by  Correlation  coefficients among  net revenue  distri-
averaging  fixed  costs  computed  for  each  crop  in  butions  are shown in table  5.  Values  substantially
the  rotation.  A land  charge  of $50  per  acre  was  lower than one  suggest that portfolios  of rotations
added  for  all  rotations.  Budgeted  fixed costs  per  might be desirable  over some ranges  of risk pref-
acre  ranged  from  $105.91  for continuous  corn to  erence.
$115.56  for  the  COWAA  rotation.  As  expected,  A computer program  developed by  Raskin  and
fixed costs  were  lowest for  the rotation  requiring  Cochran (1986b)  was used to perform the stochas-
the  least  equipment.  In rotations  requiring  more  tic  dominance  analysis.  McCarl  (1990)  suggests
equipment, however, higher ownership costs  were  that when risk aversion  coefficient  information  is
partially offset by longer useful  life of machinery.  unavailable,  a useful procedure  is to  find breakeven
Consequently,  estimated  fixed  costs  did not  vary  coefficients  defining  where  preferences  between
substantially among  rotations.  options  shift.  This  method,  developed  earlier  by
For the  scenario  using separate  yield  and  price  Hammond (1974) in a different context, allows the
detrending,  net revenue  distributions  for  each  of  researcher to iteratively  determine  the largest pos-
the  five  crop  rotations  were  computed  with  and  sible interval within which dominance prevails. As
without  participation  in  government  commodity  this  study  did not  involve elicitation  of risk  pref-
programs  for  corn, wheat,  and oats.  The effect of  erences from individuals, the breakeven coefficient
participation was based on legislation enacted with  method was  used to identify risk preference  inter-
titles  III (wheat),  IV (feedgrains),  and XI (general  vals reflecting unique preference rankings.  The re-
commodity  programs)  of  the  1990  Farm  Bill  suiting  intervals  can  be  compared  to  empirically
(USDA  1990).  Variable  costs  were  reduced pro-  estimated  risk aversion  coefficients from previous
portionally  with  the  required  acreage  reduction.  studies  (e.g.,  Love and Robison  1984;  Wilson and
Basic  loan rates  were estimated  as  the  average  of  Eidman 1983; Tauer  1986). Scaling of the outcome
deflated basic loan rates for years  1988/89 through  variable  must  be accounted  for  in  drawing  inter-
1992/93  (USDA  1994),  and national average  mar-
ket prices were estimated as the average  of deflated
national  average  crop  prices  from  1988  to  1992  Table 4.  Summary Statistics  of Net Revenue
(Pennsylvania Agricultural  Statistics Service  1993;  Distrib  s 
USDA 1991-92).  Set-asides for the acreage reduc-
tion program (ARP)  were  assumed to be 7.5%  for  Scenario  1  Scenario 2
corn,  10%  for  wheat,  and  0%  for  oats,  based  on  Yield,  Gross
historical data published by the USDA (1994). Pro-  Price Detrended  Revenue  Detrended
gram yields  were calculated  as the  simple average  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
of experimental yields  from  1980 to  1984, and an-
nounced  loan  rates  were  based  on Centre  County  c  65,333  44,334  62,926  37,463
C-G  68,419  41,009 figures  (ASCS,  personal  communication,  1994).  Cs  32,804  30,389  28104  23,245
Deficiency  payments  were not calculated on  acre-  CS-G  33,409  28,830
age allocated to ARP or normal flex acres (15%  of  CAA  69,323  26,585  66,129  20,200
base  acreage).  ARP  set-aside  was  assumed  to  be  CAA-G  69,324  26,169
seeded  with  annual  ryegrass.  Soybeans  were  CCAAA  73,661  24,881  67,988  20,244
CCAAA-G  74,174  24,111 treated under the mandatory marketing loan provi-  COWAA  19,131  20,838  15,769  16207
sions of the  1990 Farm Bill (USDA  1990), with an  COWAA-G  22,670  20,657
announced  loan rate of $5.02 (USDA 1994), which
where  C =  corn, S =  soybeans, A = alfalfa,  O =  oats, W = effectively  imposed  a price floor,  wheat.
Summary  statistics of the  resulting  net revenue  (G following rotation name denotes participation in government
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Table  5.  Correlation Coefficients  of Net  trending,  and both the CAA and CCAAA rotations
Revenue  Distributions  in the case of gross revenue detrending.  Preference
rankings  under  generalized  stochastic  dominance
C  CS  CAA  CCAAA  COWAA  are shown in table 6 for the case of separate yield
C  1.00  0.77  0.39  0.58  0.34  and price detrending,  and in table 7 for the case of
cs  1.00  0.62  0.70  0.67  gross revenue  detrending.
CAA  1.00  0.83  0.77  The continuous corn rotation (C) ranked first  in
CCAAA  1.00  0.84  risk-preferring  intervals  characterized  by  Pratt-
COWAA  1.00
Arrow coefficients  as high as -0.000011.  The con-
tinuous  corn rotation dropped rapidly  in the rank-
ings  as  risk  aversion  increased,  suggesting  that  a
pretations  from previous  studies  (Raskin and  Co-  risk  s 
rough  knowledge  of risk  preferences  may  be  of
chran  1986a). considerable  importance  in identifying  a preferred
rotation.  The magnitude  of this importance  can be
quantified  in  terms  of  estimated  willingness-to-
Results  pay.  Relative  to  a  given  rotation,  willingness-to-
pay for another rotation can be estimated  by itera-
In general,  the two detrending  approaches  yielded  tively  shifting  the  rotation's  cumulative  distribu-
similar stochastic  dominance  results. The efficient  tion  of  returns  until  neither  rotation  dominates.
set  under  first-degree  stochastic  dominance  in-  Willingness-to-pay  for the CCAAA  rotation  over
cluded the continuous  corn (C),  CAA, and CCAAA  the continuous corn rotation was estimated as -$54
rotations.  The  efficient  set  under  second-degree  per  acre  at a risk aversion coefficient  of -0.0001,
stochastic  dominance  included  only the  CCAAA  $13  per acre given risk neutrality,  and $56 per acre
rotation in the case  of separate price  and yield de-  at a risk aversion  coefficient  of 0.0001.
Table 6.  Preference  Rankings of Crop Rotations  with and without Government Program
Participation
Absolute  Risk Aversion  Coefficient
Lower  -.005000  -.000022  -.000021  -.000013  -.000011  -.000010
Upper  -.000023  -.000022  -.000014  -.000012  -.000011  -.000007
Ranking
C  1  1  2  4  4  4
C-G  2  2  1  1  2  3
CS  7  7  7  7  8  8
CS-G  8  8  8  8  7  7
CAA  5  5  5  5  5  5
CAA-G  6  6  6  6  6  6
CCAAA  3  4  4  3  3  2
CCAAA-G  4  3  3  2  1  1
COWAA  10  10  10  10  10  10
COWAA-G  9  9  9  9  9  9
Absolute Risk  Aversion Coefficient
Lower  -.000006  -.000001  0  .000065  .000075  .000094
Upper  -.000002  -.000001  .000064  .000074  .000093  .005000
Ranking
C  6  6  6  7  8  9
C-G  5  5  5  5  5  5
CS  8  8  8  8  7  7
CS-G  7  7  7  6  6  6
CAA  3  3  4  4  4  4
CAA-G  4  4  3  3  3  3
CCAAA  2  2  2  2  2  2
CCAAA-G  1  1  1  1  1  1
COWAA  10  10  10  10  10  10
COWAA-G  9  9  9  9  9  8112  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 7.  Preference Rankings of Crop Rotations Incorporating Price-Yield  Interactions
Absolute  Risk Aversion Coefficient
Lower  -.005000  -.000081  -.000010  -.000006  .000098
Upper  -.000082  -.000011  -.000007  .000097  .005000
Ranking
C  1  1  2  3  3
CS  4  4  4  4  5
CAA  2  3  3  2  2
CCAAA  3  2  1  1  1
COWAA  5  5  5  5  4
The  CCAAA  rotation  dominated  for risk aver-  alternatives  (e.g.,  crop  insurance  or  futures  mar-
sion coefficients  greater than -0.00001,  which  are  kets).
expected  to  encompass  the  majority  of  farmers'  While  data  obtained  from  experimental  plots
risk preferences.  The CS rotation ranked low in all  promise  greater  reliability,  internal  validity,  and
intervals. Rotations incorporating government pro-  cost savings compared with actual farm data, ques-
grams ranked  higher than their counterparts  with-  tions of external  validity might  still be raised. Av-
out participation  for  all  risk  averse  and  approxi-  erage  corn,  alfalfa,  and oats yields  from  the  crop
mately  risk neutral  intervals.  Table  8 shows  esti-  rotation  study  exceeded  Pennsylvania  average
mated willingness-to-pay  per acre for participation  yields  by  a  wide  margin  (Pennsylvania  Agricul-
in  government  commodity  programs  under  the  tural  Statistics  Service  1993).  Also,  when  a crop
1990  Farm  Bill  at  selected  levels  of risk prefer-  failure  occurred  on  a  small  experimental  plot,  it
ence.  As  expected,  willingness-to-pay  increased  was  difficult to identify how yield would have re-
for  all  rotations  as  risk aversion  increased.  Con-  sponded  over a large  field.
tinuous  corn had the  widest range  in willingness-
to-pay, ranging  from  a low of $4.31  per acre  at a
risk aversion  coefficient  of -0.00001  to a high of  Summary  and Conclusions
$23.67  per  acre  at  a risk  aversion  coefficient  of
0.0001.  This  study  used  1969-89 yield  data from  a long-
In general,  the  selection  of  a crop rotation  ap-  term crop rotation experiment conducted  in central
peared  to have more impact  on net revenues  than  Pennsylvania to  analyze the effects of risk prefer-
the decision to participate in the now-defunct gov-  ences on  crop rotation decisions.  Net revenue  dis-
ernment commodity  programs.  For example,  at  a  tributions  for a 400-acre  cash crop farm were  de-
risk aversion coefficient of 0.0001, estimated will-  veloped for each of the five crop rotations  studied,
ingness-to-pay  for rotation C with government pro-  with and without participation in government com-
grams  versus  without  government  programs  was  modity programs  under the  1990 Farm  Bill.  Both
$24  per  acre,  while  estimated  willingness-to-pay  yield risk and  output price risk were  introduced.
for the CCAAA rotation versus rotation C was $56  The  resulting  net  revenue  distributions  were
per acre.  Interpretation  of table  8 should be made  subjected  to  generalized  stochastic  dominance
with  the  recognition  that  it  does  not  reflect  the  analysis.  Breakeven  risk  aversion  coefficients,
possible  incorporation  of  other risk  management  which  defined risk preference  intervals  character-
ized  by  unique,  complete  preference  rankings,
were determined. Continuous  corn dominated  over
Table 8.  Estimated Willingness-to-Pay  for  most  of the  risk-preferring  range,  and  a two-year
Government  Commodity  Programs ($/Acre)  corn,  three-year  alfalfa  rotation  (CCAAA)  domi-
nated over intervals  with risk aversion coefficients
Absolute Risk  Aversion Coefficient  greater than-.00001. greater than -.00001.
-.00001  0  .00001  .0001  In this particular application the expected profit-
C  $4.31  $7.72  $11.08  $23.67  maximizing  rotation dominated  over  a wide range
cs  $0.18  $1.52  $2.45  $6.22  of risk  preferences.  Zacharias  and  Grube  (1984)
CAA  -$0.30  $0.00  $0.25  $3.27  obtained a similar result. For prescriptive  purposes,
CCAAA  $0.78  $1.29  $1.68  $2.95  it is convenient that the optimal solution under risk
COWAA  $8.73  $8.82  $8.98  $10.39  neutrality  was fairly  robust.  Caution  is advised  inMaynard, Harper, and Hoffman  Crop Rotation Choice  113
anticipating  such a relationship a priori,  however.  Risk Management Strategies for Agricultural Production
As  Raskin  and  Cochran  (1986a)  illustrated,  deci-  Firms. Proceedings  of a  seminar sponsored  by  Southern
sion  makers  with apparently  similar risk aversion  Regional  Project  S-180.  Pullman,  Wash.:  Washington
coefficients  of 0.0002  and 0.0003  would  differ in  State University.
the valuation of their 50,001st dollar by a factor of  Duffy, P.A., and C.R.  Taylor. 1994. "Effects  on a Corn-Soybean
160.  Farm of Uncertainty  about  the Future  of Farm Programs."
Participation..  . . programswaAmerican  Journal  of Agricultural  Economics 76:141-52. Participation  in  government programs  was  pre-
ferred  for  all  rotations  in  the  approximately  risk  Ford, B.P., W.N. Musser, and R.D. Yonkers.  1993.  "Measuring
Historical  Risk  in  Quarterly  Milk  Prices."  Agricultural
neutral and risk averse intervals, but was generally  and Resource Economics Review 22:20-26.
not preferred  in strongly  risk-preferring  intervals.
. Hammond,  J.S.  1974.  "Simplifying  the  Choice  between  Un-
Estimated  willingness-to-pay  for participation  in Estimated  willingness-to-pay  for  participation  in  certain Prospects  Where  Preference  Is Nonlinear."  Man-
government  commodity  programs  ranged  from  agement Science 201047-72.
-$0.30 to  $23.67 per acre  over the  selected  range -$0.30  to  $23.67  per  acre over the  selected  range  Harper, J.K., J.R. Williams, R.O. Burton,  Jr.,  and K.W.  Kelley.
of risk preferences.  For most levels  of risk prefer-  1991  "Effect  of Risk  Preferences  on  Incorporation  of
ence, crop rotation selection appeared to have more  Double-Crop  Soybeans  into Traditional  Rotations."  Re-
impact than the  decision to participate in the now-  view of Agricultural Economics 13:185-200.
obsolete  government  commodity programs.  King,  R.P.,  and  G.E.  Oamek.  1983.  "Risk  Management  by
During the period 1990-92, harvested field crop  Colorado Dryland Wheat  Farmers  and the Elimination  of
acreage  in Pennsylvania averaged  940,000 acres in  the  Disaster  Assistance  Program."  American Journal of
corn  for  grain,  797,000  acres  in  alfalfa  hay,  Agricultural  Economics 65:247-55.
287,000  acres in soybeans,  190,000 acres in winter  King, R.P.,  and L.J. Robison.  1981.  "An Interval Approach  to
wheat,  and  218,000  acres  in  oats  (Pennsylvania  Measuring Decision  Maker Preferences."  American Jour-
Agricultural  Statistics  Service  1993). The  stochas-  nal ofAgricultural Economics 63:510-20.
tic  dominance  results  are roughly  consistent  with  Kurtz,  L.T.,  L.V.  Boone,  T.R.  Peck,  and  R.G.  Hoeft.  1984.
these  values,  providing  a degree  of confidence  in  "Crop Rotations for Efficient Nitrogen Use."  In Nitrogen
the use of experimental yield data, stochastic  domi-  and Crop Production, ed.  R.D.  Hauck.  Madison,  Wise.:
nance  analysis,  and the  simplifying  assumption of  American  Society of Agronomy,  Inc.,  Crop Science  Soci-
a  cash  crop  farm.  The  existence  of  unidentified  ety of America, Inc., Soil Science Society of America, Inc.
optimal portfolios  of rotations, variation in net rev-  Love, RO., and L.J. Robison.  1984. "An  Empirical Analysis of
enue  relationships,  and  divergence  between  cash  the  Intertemporal  Stability of Risk  Preference."  Southern
Journal of Agricultural Economics 16:159-66.
values  and  feed  values  may  partially  explain  the  Journal ofAgcultural Economics 16:159-66.
relatively  high  acreage  in corn and  the substantial  McCarl,  B.A.  1990.  "Generalized  Stochastic  Dominance:  An
acreage.in  soybeans,  oats,  and wheat.  Empirical  Examination."  Southern Journal of Agricul-
acreage in  soybeans,  oats,  and wheat.  tural Economics 22 49-5
The data set  used  in this  study  provided  a rare
opportunity  to study the economic  effects  of crop-  Meyer,  J. 1977.  "Choice  among  Distributions."  Journal of opportunity to study the economic  effects  of crop-  " „'  . ^  ,  ,^  „ Economic Theory  14:326-36.
ping  systems. It covered  a substantially  longer pe-
riod than  most  agronomic  studies,  and  it allowed  Musser,  W.N.  1994.  "Progress  in Risk  Analysis  in  Regional
onsideration of roionl  yid e  . Te l  - Projects."  Paper  presented  at  1994  meeting  of Regional
Research Project S-232, Gulf Shores State Park, Al, March
tion of the  study  helps fill a need for site-specific  24-26.
risk management research on Northeastern crop ro-  Musser,  WN.,  V.J.  Alexander,  B.V.  Tew,  and  D.A.  Smittle.
tations.  1985.  "A  Mathematical  Programming  Model  for  Veg-
etable Rotations."  Southern Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics 17:169-76.
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